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technology and marketing skills. Smarzynska assesses  share ownership. This is true in high- and  medium-
joint ventures' potential for such transfers by comparing  technology sectors but not in industries with low R&D
the characteristics of foreign investors engaged in joint  spending.
ventures with those of foreign investors engaged in  Smarzvnska concludes that it is inappropriate  to treat
wholly owned projects in transition economies in the  industries as homogeneous in investigating modes of
early 1990s.  investment. She also suggests that in sectors with high
Unlike the existing literature. Smarzvnska focuses on  R&D spending joint ventures may present less potential
intra-industrv differences rather than interindustry  for transfer of technology  and marketing techniques than
differences in R&D and advertising intensity.  wlholly  owned subsidiaries.
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During the last several decades, there has been a significant change in the attitudes of
governments, especially those in developing countries, towards foreign direct investment
(FDI). Rather than viewed as evil exploiters, foreign investors are now welcomed as a source
of new technologies, better management and marketing techniques and creators of skilled jobs.
Not all types of foreign investment, however, are perceived as equally beneficial to host
countries. Governments tend to favor joint ventures (JVs) over other forms of FDI, since they
believe that active participation of local firms facilitates the absorption of new technologies
and marketing skills.' We leave aside the issue of whether this perception is true, and instead
we attempt to compare the potential of JVs and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries for such
transfers.
While the existing literature demonstrates that (lifferences  in R&D and advertising
intensities between industries influence a foreign investor's choice of entry mode, we focus on
patterns present within industries. We provide empirical evidence indicating that industry
structure affects the choice of entry mode and thus treating industries as homogenous, as it was
done in the earlier studies, is not appropriate. We find that JVNls  in manufacturing sectors tend to
be undertaken by foreign investors possessing fewer intangible assets than their counterparts
involved in wholly owned projects. We show that these effects are present in higher R&D
industries but not in low technology sectors. Therefore, our findings suggest that JVs in more
R&D intensive sectors may present a lower potential for transfers of technology and marketing
skills than wholly owned foreign subsidiaries.
Theoretical literature suggests that costs involved in drafting and enforcing contracts
guiding the transfers of proprietary know-how to JVs as well as the threat of knowledge
dissipation may make shared ownership less attractive and encourage establishment of wholly
owned subsidiaries. Firms differentiating  their products through advertising may also seek full
ownership to assure the quality of their products and prevent debasing of their trademarks.
I See Beamish (1988), Blomstrom and Zejan (1991), Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1998). Such views have led some
host countries to restrict the extent of foreign ownership or to offer special incentives to foreign investors
undertaking JVs with local partners. For instance, in the 1980s restrictions on foreign ownership were present in
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Republ]ic  of Korea and Sri Lanka (UNCTC,
1987).
IEmpirical studies confirm these predictions by finding a negative relationship between industry
or firm level R&D and advertising intensities and the probability of shared ownership
(Stopford and Wells, 1972; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Asiedu and
Esfahani, 1998).2
In contrast to existing research, we propose that the choice of entry mode depends not
only on R&D or advertising intensity of a sector but also on an investor's endowment of
intangible assets relative to the industry average (hereafter referred to as relative R&D and
advertising intensity). Relative endowment of intangible assets may affect a firm's choice of
entry mode in two opposing ways.
On the one hand, technological and marketing leaders in an industry may have a greater
bargaining power in negotiations with local firms and authorities and may be able to secure
more favorable terms of JV agreements. Thus, they are likely to gain more from such
arrangements than industry laggards. 3 In R&D-intensive sectors, foreign technological leaders
may also be so advanced compared to domestic firms that technology leakage may not pose a
severe threat since local firms may be unable to use independently  the knowledge acquired
through a JV. Thus, we should expect to observe that industry leaders are more likely to share
ownership than industry laggards.
On the other hand, if the gap between foreign and domestic firms does not guarantee
protection against dissipation of intangible assets, industry leaders may be more averse to
shared ownership than industry laggards. Moreover, they may use their bargaining power to
negotiate sole ownership in countries where foreign ownership is restricted by the government.
In that case, relative endowment of intangible assets would be positively correlated with the
probability of full ownership. Thus, the theoretical predictions are ambiguous and an empirical
investigation is necessary to shed some light on this issue.
In this study, we test whether intraindustry differences in intangible assets affect a
foreign investor's choice of entry mode. We also examine whether these effects are the same in
industries with different levels of R&D spending. In our analysis, we focus on manufacturing
2 R&D intensity is defined as expenditure on R&D expressed as a percentage of net sales. In the text, the terms
"R&D expenditure," "R&D spending," and "R&D efforts" refer to R&D intensity. Sectors with a high average
R&D intensity are described as high technology or R&D-intensive sectors.
3There  exist evidence indicating that firms with higher R&D spending enjoy a greater bargaining power in
negotiations with host country govermnents (see Stopford and Wells, 1972; UJNCTAD,  1992).
2industries and use a unique dataset on foreign investment  projects in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union in the early 1  990s. Our dataset is based on a worldwide survey of
companies conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development (EBRD) and
contains information on foreign investments in twenty-two transition economies.
We begin the analysis by estimating a model similar to those found in the earlier
studies. As expected, we find that firm or industry level R&D spending and firm advertising
expenditure are negatively related to the probability of a JV and positively correlated with the
likelihood of a wholly owned project. Thus, we show that factors governing the choice of entry
mode in transition economies are similar to those present in other regions.
To test our first hypothesis, we include in the model industry level R&D intensity as
well as the ratio of a firm's R&D spending to the industry mean. The latter variable serves as a
proxy for a firm's technological sophistication.  We recognize that R&D intensity is not a
perfect measure of a firm's intangible assets and that firms may have other intangible assets
they are concerned about dissipating, such as distribution and marketing techniques. To take
this into account, we add an analogous variable capturing sophistication  of marketing
techniques. Additionally, we control for other firm specific characteristics and progress of
reform in a host country. We also improve over the existing studies by taking into account
possible sample selection bias arising from the fact that the same firm characteristics affect
both a firm's decision whether to invest and the choice of entry mode.
The empirical analysis supports our hypothesis that an investor's endowment of
intangible assets relative to other firms in the industry influences their choice of entry mode.
We find a negative relationship between an investor's technological and marketing
sophistication and the probability of shared ownership. Thus, our results indicate that industry
structure affects investors' behavior and industrial sectors should not be treated as homogenous
in an examination of entry mode.
We also test whether these effects vary between industries by allowing for different
coefficients in high/medium and low technology sectors. We show that the impact of
technological and marketing sophistication on the choice of enitry  mode is statistically
significant in the former but not in the latter group of industries. This finding is robust to
different classifications of sectors.
3This study is structured in the following manner. The next section reviews the related
literature. In section III, we present our hypotheses, followed by a description of the dataset
and the statistical models in section IV. The empirical results are discussed in section V. The
concluding remarks close the paper.
II.  Related Literature
Theory
The theory suggests that in order to compete successfully in a foreign market a firm
must possess the so called ownership advantages that can take the form of a superior
technology, proprietary knowledge, managerial and marketing skills and so on. A firm can earn
rents on these assets through ann's  length transactions (e.g., licensing, franchising, turnkey
contracts) or by creating a subsidiary or engaging in a JV in a foreign country. Assessing the
value of intangible assets is a difficult task and is associated with information asymmetry. The
seller may not receive adequate payment since he may not be able disclose the full potential of
future profits generated by a given technology to a prospective buyer without giving away
private information on the technology itself (see Dunning, 1988). Thus, firms possessing more
sophisticated technologies may face more uncertainty in pricing and may prefer wholly owned
projects to JVs or arm's length transactions.
Furthermore, a wholly owned venture might be preferred to shared ownership in order
to guard against leakage of sensitive information. For example, a foreign investor may be
concerned that in the case of JV dissolution, the local partner will remain in possession of the
technology acquired from the multinational and will become a competitor in third markets. The
JV agreement may not offer a full protection against this possibility since it may be difficult to
specify all contingencies in the contract. 4 Additionally, the local partner may use proprietary
information obtained from the multinational in its own wholly owned operations, thus hurting
4A  significant number of JVs terminate during the first few years of their existence. For instance, thirty-five out of
ninety-two JVs examined by Kogut (1989) failed within seven years. Twenty-seven percent of JVs surveyed by
Miller et al. (1996) were not expected to survive by their partners. Killing (1982) reported that thirty-six percent of
partners rated the performance of their JVs as unsatisfactory.
4the JV and the foreign partner (Gomes-Casseres, 1989).5  The multinational may also fear that if
the local partner controls the employment policy, it may not put enough effort into keeping key
employees who may leave and reveal their knowledge of the production process to the
competition. 6
Firms investing heavily in advertising also have reasons to seek full ownership. A JV
partner may have a strong incentive to free ride on the reputation of a foreign partner by
debasing the quality of the product carrying the foreign trademark. In such a case, the local
partner appropriates the full benefits of debasement while bearing only a small fraction of the
costs (Caves, 1982; Horstmann and Markusen, 1987). Full ownership also allows foreign
investors to retain control over the marketing strategy and eliminates the need to persuade the
local partner about the optimal level and mix of marketing expenditure. In summary, the theory
predicts that firms with greater intangible assets should prefer full ownership to JVs.
The preferences of a host country government regarding the extent of foreign
ownership may differ from those of a multinational corporatjion.  Therefore, the entry mode
used may be a result of a bargaining process between the two parties (Gomes-Casseres, 1990).
Studies of the bargaining approach predict that multinational corporations in R&D-intensive
industries enjoy a greater bargaining power in negotiations with local authorities (Gomes-
Casseres, 1990, see also UNCTAD, 1992).
Empirical evidence
Earlier empirical research on the relationship between intangible assets and the choice
of entry mode found a negative correlation between firm or industry R&D intensity and the
probability of shared ownership (Stopford and Wells, 1  972; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988;
Asiedu and Esfahani, 1998). Some studies, however, did not produce statistically significant
results (e.g., Gomez-Casseres, 1989; Blomstr6m and Z;ejan,  1991). Similarly, advertising
intensity was shown to be negatively related to the probability of a JV (Gomes-Casseres, 1989
and 1990) but in some studies this relationship was no: statistically significant (Hennart, 1991).
5Unilever's  JV in Shanghai may serve as an example. The Chinese partner began to manufacture a washing
detergent that had a similar formula and was packaged in a strikingly similar box as the Omo brand produced by the
JV. (The Economist, April 19, 1997).
5The only examination of entry modes used by foreign firms investing in Eastern Europe
was undertaken by Meyer (1998). He analyzed characteristics of British and Gerrnan
companies engaged in minority and majority JVs and wholly owned projects in the region. For
each of these categories, he estimated a logit model with the dependent variable equal to one if
the particular entry mode was chosen and zero otherwise. He found a significant positive
correlation between a firm's R&D intensity and the probability of a wholly owned subsidiary
and a negative relationship with the likelihood of a JV. The latter effect was present in the case
of minority, majority or all types of JVs combined.
Gomes-Casseres (1990) analyzed the choice between full and shared ownership in the
context of bargaining theory. Among other variables, his model included industry level R&D
spending as well as its interaction with a dummy variable for countries restricting the extent of
foreign ownership. A positive correlation between the interaction term and the probability of a
wholly owned subsidiary would indicate that investors in more R&D-intensive sectors can
more easily negotiate full ownership. Neither of the two variables, however, turned out to be
statistically significant. 7
III.  Hypotheses
In contrast to the earlier literature, we postulate that the choice of entry mode is
influenced not only by R&D intensity of a given industry but also by R&D spending of a
foreign investor relative  to other firms within the sector. Thus, there exist both inter and
intraindustry  effects. However, the sign of the within industry effect is unclear. 8
On the one hand, investors enjoying a technological lead in their sector are perceived as
more attractive JV partners by local firms and governments. Thus, they are able to negotiate
more favorable terms of a JV agreement. Additionally, industry leaders may be able to
6 In Bulgaria,  the Commission  for the Protection  of Competition  has investigated  cases  of violation  of business
secrets  by former  employees.  Some  of these  cases  have  been  brought  by foreign  companies  operating  in the country
(Hoekman  and Djankov,  1997).
7See  Gomes-Casseres  (1990)  for a brief  review  of the earlier  tests  of the bargaining  theory  and a description  of their
limitations.
8Note  that  Cohen  and  Klepper  (1992)  showed  that  the distributions  of R&D  intensity  within  different  industries
"display  a strikingly  regular  pattern"  (p. 773).
6undertake JVs with more successful local companies than foreign technological laggards. 9
Moreover, the technology gap between foreign leaders and domestic producers may be so large
that even in the presence of knowledge transfer to a JV the threat of losing intangible assets
may be minimal. Thus, industry leaders may be more willing to undertake JVs than industry
laggards.
On the other hand, the technology gap may not be enough to prevent knowledge
dissipation. Investors possessing technological advantage over other firms in their sector may
potentially incur greater losses from knowledge dissipation than investors with less
sophisticated technologies. It may also be more difficult to price cutting edge technologies than
mature ones. Thus, shared ownership may be less appealing to industry leaders who may use
their bargaining power to negotiate with the host country government an exemption from the
restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership, should such restrictions be present. 10
In summary, the theoretical predictions about thLe  relaitionship  between relative R&D
intensity and the likelihood of a JV are ambiguous. Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix I illustrate the
two scenarios described above. Each segment in the figures corresponds to one industry.
Note that alternatively we could adopt the assumption, often employed in the literature
(e.g., Ethier and Markusen, 1996), that knowledge dissi.pation  takes place regardless of the
form a multinational corporation uses to service a local market. Thus, regardless whether the
multinational enters through a wholly owned subsidiary or a .JV  with a local partner, it will lose
its intangible assets after a certain time because of employee turnover. This loss is, however,
likely to be more costly to a firm with more sophisticated technologies. Under this assumption,
the question of interest is whether it is cheaper for the multinational to buy loyalty from
employees of its wholly owned subsidiary or from a local paitner. The literature (e.g., Ethier
9In  general,  foreign  investors  tend to choose  more  successful  local companies  for acquisitions  or JV arrangements.
For instance,  the analysis  of firm level  data showed  that  foreign  investment  in  the Czech  Republic  flows  to local
firms of above-average  size,  initial  profitability  and  initial  labor  productivity  (Djankov  and  Hoekman,  1998).
10  Foreign  investors  often  take precautions  against  losses  of their  proprielary  knowledge.  Warhurst  (1991)  provides
some  examples  of such efforts  on the part of multinational  corporations  engaged  in JVs  in China.  For instance,
foreign  experts  training  employees  of the Chinese  partner  were reported  to withhold  certain  technical  knowledge,
blueprints,  etc.  In one case,  the Chinese  company  was not alloweel  to have access  to the "'know-why'  which  would
enable  it to absorb  fully  and alter  the technology  for future  needs"  (p. 1063).  In another  case,  the training  of a
Chinese  team in  the investor's  home country  took  place  in a rented  section  of a university  and not in the company
research  center  which  may  have  been  related  in  part "to a concern  about  protecting  proprietary  technology"  (p.
1067).
7and Markusen, 1996) shows that this depends on the parameters of the model.'" Thus, again the
theory provides us with ambiguous predictions.
Our second hypothesis is that the impact of relative R&D intensity may not be the same
in all industries. It is plausible that relative R&D intensity plays an important role in high and
medium but not in low technology sectors. In low R&D sectors, technological sophistication
may be of lesser importance to potential local partners. At the same time, foreign investors may
be less concerned about losing their technological superiority. Thus, there may exist no
correlation between relative R&D intensity and the choice of entry mode in these industries. If
this is the case, we will observe a relationship portrayed in Figure 3.
The figures also indicate that studies treating industries as homogenous, and thus
ignoring the impact of relative R&D intensity, would produce a negative relationship between
industry R&D efforts and the likelihood of a JV. A negative correlation would also be found if
only a firm's R&D expenditure were included in the model. Hence, while the results of the
earlier studies are consistent with the proposed framework, they capture only a part of the true
relationship. If the data do not support our hypothesis, we should observe a negative correlation
between the probability of a JV and firm or industry level R&D spending. However, the effect
of relative R&D intensity should be insignificant.
One caveat of using relative R&D expenditure as a proxy for technological leadership is
that R&D intensity is not a perfect measure of a firm's success in innovative activities.
Furthermore, in low technology sectors differences between (small in general) R&D activities
may not have strong effects. Finally, technology is not the only intangible asset firms may be
concerned about losing. Leadership in terms of managerial techniques, marketing strategies and
distribution skills may be far more important in some industries. To capture this effect, we will
also control for the advertising intensity of an industry and relative advertising intensity of a
firm.
Note that we assume here that all foreign investors have an option of engaging in a JV
with a local partner, should they want to do so. Thus, the supply of local JV partners is not
constrained, and the observed entry patterns are determined entirely by foreign investors'
demand. Considering that the aggregate FDI inflows into transition economies were quite small
1"  Note that Ethier and Markusen (1996) focus on the choice between exporting, licensing and acquiring a
subsidiary.
8during the period covered by our sample, this assumption  is quite realistic. Additionally, since
most firms in our sample are relatively large, they most likely enjoyed an advantage in their
search for local partners.' 2
We also assume that the available local partners fulfill some minimum standards set by
foreign investors. Note that a difference in technological sophistication between foreign and
local firms may be not be a serious obstacle to a successful JV agreement, since as surveys
indicate local partners are expected to contribute their knowledge of market conditions,
distribution networks and ability to deal with government officials, rather than to provide
technological expertise (OECD, 1994).
In addition to proxies for intangible assets, the estimated model includes other
variables. Blomstrom and Zejan (1991) mention that larger firms are more willing to take
higher risks and are therefore more likely to engage in wholly owned projects than smaller
companies. Thus, we control for a firm's size and expect to find that it is negatively correlated
with the probability of a JV. Note, however, that the empiricel investigations have often
produced the opposite result (Blomstr6m and Zej  an, 1991; Meyer, 1998).'3  Stopford and Wells
(1972) point out that more diversified firms tend to more tolerant towards minority ownership
and are more likely to engage in JVs. This finding has been confirmed by Meyer (1998).
Therefore, we also control for production diversification and anticipate a positive sign on its
coefficient.
Usually, a major contribution of a local partner to a JV is the knowledge of the
business environment in a host country. We can expect that as foreign investors learn more
about local conditions, their need for a local partner declines (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Thus,
we control for investor's regional experience and expect to obtain a negative sign. Note,
however, that a study by Meyer (1988) produced a positive coefficient. Similarly, we take into
account firm's international experience. As Blomstr6m and Zejan (1991) show, firms with a
greater experience in foreign operations are less likely to share ownership.
12  For instance, Brouthers and Bamossy (1997, p. 297)  report that.  some state owned enterprises in the region had
only limited knowledge of western firms, which led them to restrict their search for foreign JV partners to major,
well-known western multinationals.
13 We also experimented with including firm size relative to the industry average but this variable did not appear to
be statistically significant and adding it to our regressions had little impact on other coefficients.
9The choice between full and shared ownership is also likely to be influenced by the
investment climate in a host country. On the one hand, having a local partner that is well
connected with local authorities may be more useful in countries with less friendly attitude
towards FDI. On the other hand, in economies with a more developed legal system and better
corporate governance, foreign investor may be confident that potential disputes with local
partners can be resolved fairly through the court system and thus they may be less averse to
shared ownership. In summary, the relationship between business environment in a host
country and the form of investment is ambiguous.
IV.  Data and Statistical Models
The dataset used in this study is based on the EBRD survey of foreign investors
supplemented with the information obtained from the Worldscope database." 4 In January 1995,
a brief questionnaire was sent out to all companies (about 9,500) listed in Worldscope.
Responses were obtained from 1,405 firms that answered questions regarding their investments
in Eastern European transition economies and the former Soviet Republics, a total of twenty-
two countries. The dataset contains information on both investors and non-investors.
In the case of investors, the type of entry mode for existing and planned projects in the
region is known. The survey respondents were asked to classify each of their projects as a JV,
acquisition or greenfield. For the purpose of this study, we consider all greenfield and
acquisition projects not associated with JVs to be wholly owned.
The dataset does not include any information on the timing of each investment. Since
the magnitude of FDI inflows was marginal before 1989, the information collected pertains
mostly to the period 1989-94.15  Table 1 presents the breakdown of entry modes for each of the
host countries in the sample. Note that JVs outnumber wholly owned projects in all but one
host country and they constitute sixty-two percent of all projects.
During the last decade, transition economies undertook dramatic liberalization of their
FDI regimes. For instance, in the USSR a presidential decree issued as early as October 1990
14  Worldscope is a commercial database that provides detailed financial statements, business descriptions, and
historical pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than fifty countries.
10allowed foreign wholly owned companies to be established in the form of branches or
subsidiaries. The decree also created the legal basis for foreign investors to buy out existing
Soviet enterprises as these were privatized (McMillan 1996,  p. 50). In Hungary, Act XXIV of
1988 on the Investment of Foreigners in Hungary allowed non-Hungarian companies to own
equity up to 100% (WTO, 1998). In Poland, the 1988 Law oni  Economic Activity with the
Participation of Foreign Parties permitted 100 per cent foreign equity participation (GATT,
1992).
To the best of our knowledge, in none of the countries in the sample there exists
legislation specifically forbidding full ownership by foreign investors. It is possible, however,
that in practice permissions for fully owned projects may be denied in some economies. To
take this possibility into account, we include host country dummies in our model and show that
this change does not strongly affect the results. In many transition economies, however, FDI in
sectors such as production of military equipment and extraction of natural resources is subject
to restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership." 6 Therefore, we exclude firms in the coal, gas
and oil industry from our sample.
In our investigation, we take into account only imanufacturing  sectors since in many
service industries, for instance, banking, insurance, telecommunications,  there exist restrictions
on the extent of foreign ownership. In others, such as accounting and public relations services,
it may be extremely difficult to measure the endowment of intangible assets. Table 2 presents
the percentage of foreign investors who chose a given entry rnode in each industry. The figures
indicate that JV is the dominant form of investment in a majority of industries. It is striking
that in the drugs, cosmetics and healthcare products sector only twelve percent of all projects
are JVs, while wholly owned subsidiaries account for eighty-eight percent of investments. 17
Similarly, wholly owned projects constitute eighty percent of all investments in the beverage
sector. The drugs, cosmetics and healthcare products sector is the most R&D-intensive industry
and in the beverage sector marketing activities play a very imnportant  role, thus the fear of
losing intangible assets is a likely explanation of the underrepresentation of JVs.
15  Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union were virtually closed to foreign investment before 1989 (see
Dunning and Rojec, 1993;  Meyer, 1995; Hunya, 1997).
16 See Dunning and Rojec (1993) for a description of these restrictions.
17  If we consider the drugs sector (SIC code 283) only, the figures are ten and ninety percent, respectively.
11Following the earlier studies, we will begin our analysis by estimating a probit model
with the dependent variable taking on the value of one if investor i has engaged in a JV with a
local partner in country c, and zero if the project was wholly owned. Thus, the number of
observations will be equal to the number of projects undertaken in the region by all firms in the
sample. 1
We will improve over the existing literature by controlling for the possible sample
selection bias. It is likely that the coefficient estimates from a model describing the choice
between full and shared ownership are inconsistent because the model does not take into
account what firms would undertake FDI in the first place. To address this issue, we will
estimate a bivariate probit model accounting for sample selection. The first equation in the
model will describe firm i's decision to undertake FDI in country c, while the second one will
model the choice between full and shared ownership." 9
All explanatory variables employed in the estimation, with the exception of regional
experience which comes from the survey, are taken from Worldscope and refer to 1993 or to
the closest year for which the information is available. Industry R&D intensity is measured by
R&D expenditure as a percentage of net sales. To find the industry averages we use figures for
all firms listed in Worldscope in a given industry. The industry averages have been calculated
at the three digit SIC industry classification. 20 To proxy for investor's technological
sophistication we use relative R&D intensity which is defined as the ratio of a firm's R&D
intensity to the industry average. 21 Industry advertising intensity is measured by Sales, General
and Administrative expenditure divided by net sales. This variable is a standard proxy for
advertising intensity used in the literature. The industry average is again calculated at the three
digit level. We define relative advertising intensity as the ratio of a firm's advertising intensity
to the industry average.
18  Note that the number of observations  will be smaller than the number of projects in Table 1 because of missing
firm specific information.
19 This model was first proposed by Wynand and van Praag (1981). Boyes et al. (1989) used it for evaluation of
credit scoring models. See Greene (1993, p. 664) for a brief description of the model.
20 When calculating industry averages, we have removed two outliers from the drug sector and one from
communications equipment industry. These firms reported R&D intensities equal to 16598, 1815 and 2560,
respectively. All three firms reported sales below $500,000 thus they are likely to be start up companies. Note that
the conclusions of the paper are remain unchanged even if this correction is not performed.
21 If firm and industry level figures were both equal to zero, relative R&D intensity took on the value of one.
12We use firm sales in millions of US dollars as a measure offirm size. Diversification is
proxied by the number of four digit SIC codes describing a firm's activities. To control for
regional experience we include a dummy variable taking on the value of one if a firm had a
trading relationship with the region before transition and zero otherwise. International
experience is measured by the share of foreign sales in a firm's total sales. Ideally, we would
like to use the share of foreign assets in a firm's total assets. This would, however, severely
reduce the size of our sample. Since the share of foreign sales is highly correlated with the
share of foreign assets (.82), we believe that it can serve as a proxy for international
experience. To capture the investment conditions in a host country, we use an index of
transition progress defined as the average of EBRD transition indicators. Transition indicators
rate the progress of a country's reforms in the following areas: price liberalization and
competition, trade and exchange system, large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization,
enterprise restructuring, and banking reform. 22 The values for 1994 for all host countries in the
sample are presented in Table 1. In the selection equation of bivariate probit, we also control
for the size of the local market as captured by the host's GDP. It is measured in millions of US
dollars and the figures come from EBRD (1994).
To test whether the same effects are present in high and low technology sectors, we
allow for different coefficients in the two groups of inclustries.  The classification of industries
is based on the average R&D intensity of each 3 digit S,IC  sector with two different cutoff
values. Additionally, we employ the classification suggested Blomstr6m, Lipsey and Ohlsson
(1991).
V.  Empirical Findings
Comparison  with the earlier studies
We begin our investigation by estimating a model comparable to those found in the
earlier literature. This exercise allows us to establish whether the same factors affect foreign
investors' choice of entry mode in transition economies as in.  other parts of the world. We
employ a probit model with the dependent variable taking on the value of one, if the project
takes the form of a JV with a local partner and zero if it is wholly owned. As the explanatory
22 See EBRD (1994, p. 11) for a detailed description.
13variables we include: an investor's size, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, a measure of
production diversification and proxies for international and regional experience. Our results are
presented in terms of marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean.
The estimates shown in the first column of Table 3 are consistent with those obtained in
the earlier studies. They indicate that firms with higher R&D and advertising intensities as well
as smaller firms are more likely to engage in wholly owned projects that in JVs. Regional
experience, international experience and production diversification, however, do not appear to
be statistically significant. Next, we add the transition index to the model and observe that
everything else equal, investors are more likely to engage in JVs in countries less advanced in
reform. Thus, we find support for the hypothesis that local,  partners are more useful in countries
with less friendly investment climate. Including the transition index has little effect on the
other variables in the regression.
Since many of the earlier studies used industry rather than firm level proxies for
intangible assets, we also estimate a model which includes average R&D and advertising
intensity for three digit SIC industries. The results, presented in the third and fourth columns of
Table 3, indicate that firms in sectors characterized by high R&D spending are less likely to
share ownership. Advertising intensity, however, does not appear to have a significant effect on
the form of investment. We also find that investors with less international experience and those
entering host countries less advanced in reform are more likely to undertake JVs. None of the
other variables is statistically significant.
In summary, our results are broadly consistent with the findings of the earlier literature.
We conclude that forces determining the entry mode of foreign investors in transition
economies are similar to those operating in other parts of the world.
Summary statistics
The next step in our investigation is to compare the average R&D intensity of investors
engaged in wholly owned projects with that of investors sharing ownership in each three digit
SIC sector. We group sectors into high, medium and low technology, following the
classification used by Blomstrom, Lipsey and Ohlsson (1991). See Appendix III for a
description.
14As Table 4 indicates, in all but one high technology industry investors engaged in
wholly owned projects are on average more R&D intensive than those sharing ownership. This
group consists of industries such as drugs, medical instruments and equipment,
communications equipment, and others. In medium technology industries, which include
industrial chemicals, motor vehicles, household appliances, etc., in half of the sectors in which
both modes are present, investors engaged in wholly owned projects are characterized by
higher level of R&D efforts. In low technology sectors, this is true in ten out of sixteen cases.
In each of the three groupings, the average R&D intensity of firms with wholly owned projects
is higher than that of firms engaged in JVs.
Testing the hypotheses
To test whether intraindustry differences in intangible assets affect the choice of entry
mode, we include in the model the average R&D intensity of each industry as well as the ratio
of a firm's R&D spending to the industry mean. We also add the corresponding variables for
advertising intensity. The results of the probit model, presented in Table 5, lend support to our
hypothesis. We find that firms with large R&D and advertising efforts relative to the industry
average are more likely to undertake wholly owned projects than to engage in JVs. This finding
holds when transition progress, host country dummies and dumamies  for European and US
firms are included.
As before, we observe that JVs tend to be undertaken by firms in less R&D intensive
industries. Additionally, smaller and more diversified firms as well as investors with less
international experience prefer shared ownership to wholly owned projects. As before,
transition progress has a negative marginal effect on the probalbility  of a JV relative to wholly
owned subsidiary. Industry advertising intensity, regional experience and dummies for
European and American investors do not appear to be statistically significant. Note that with
the exception of the international experience, which ceases to be significant at the conventional
levels, the inclusion of host country dummies does not sitrongly  affect the results.
A major drawback of employing the probit specification is that it takes into account
firms that invested in the region but not those that decided against FDI. This may be a source
of sample selection bias and may lead to inconsistent estimates. To the best of our knowledge,
none of the previous studies has, however, addressed this issue. We correct for the sample
15selection bias by estimating a bivariate probit model, where the first equation describes a firm's
decision whether to invest in a host country while the second one focuses on the choice
between full and shared ownership. The selection equation includes all variables used in the
second stage as well as the market size of the host country proxied by the GDP. It has been
shown that the market size is an important factor in the decision to undertake FDI. At the same
time, it is unlikely to affect the choice of entry mode.
Table 6 presents the estimation results. They lead us to similar conclusions as the
figures presented in the previous table. We find that firms which are leaders in terms of
technology or marketing skills are more likely to undertake wholly owned projects than to
share ownership. Thus, the data support our hypothesis that intraindustry differences in
intangible assets are important and treating industries as homogenous is not appropriate. The
signs and significance levels of the other coefficients are very similar to those found in the
probit model. The only exception is production diversification which ceases to be statistically
significant. In summary, taking sample selection into account does not have a large impact on
the estimation results.
The results from the selection equation indicate that FDI is more likely to take place in
countries with larger market size and more advanced reforms. More diversified and larger
firms as well as those with greater regional and international experience are more likely to
invest in the region. This is also true of firms in more advertising intensive industries. Relative
endowments of intangible assets and industry level R&D spending do not have a statistically
significant effect on the probability of investing. With the exception of industry R&D intensity,
all these results are consistent with the stylized facts. 23
So far we have shown that relative endowments of intangible assets affect an investor's
choice of entry mode when all manufacturing sectors are taken into account. It is likely,
however, that these effects differ between industries. As we mentioned before, technological
leadership may play an important role in high technology industries but may be of little
significance in low R&D sectors. To test this hypothesis, we reestimate our model allowing for
different coefficients for high/medium and low technology sectors. We group sectors into the
two categories based on the classification proposed by Blomstr6m, Lipsey and Ohlsson (1991).
23 Smarzynska (1999) shows that foreign investors in transition economies are characterized by low, rather than
high, R&D intensity and links this finding to weak protection of intellectual property rights.
16We also use alternative grouping method based on the average R&D intensity of the sector
with the R&D spending equal to one and two percent of net sales serving as the cutoff values. 24
The results, presented in Table 7, indicate that relative R&D intensity and industry
R&D spending affect the choice of entry mode in high and medium technology sectors but not
in low technology industries. The difference between the coefficients underlying the marginal
effects of relative R&D spending in the two groups of industries is significant at the five
percent level in the first and the third column. Relative advertising expenditure influences the
entry mode in both types of industries, though in the case of low technology sectors it is
significant in only one regression. Firm size is negatively related to the probability of shared
ownership in all industries. Transition progress, on the olher hand, is significant at the
conventional levels only in high and medium R&D sectors, though the underlying coefficients
for two groups of industries are not significantly different fromr  each other. In low technology
sectors, more diversified firms are more tolerant towards shared ownership. So are investors
without regional experience. 25
Summing up, in this section we presented the empirical evidence indicating that
differences in relative endowments of intangible assets between  firms within an industry
influence their choice of entry mode. We showed that technological and marketing leaders tend
to avoid JVs and prefer to engage in wholly owned projects. We found that effect is mainly
present in high and medium technology sectors.
24 Note that  the average  R&D  intensity  of all three  digit SIC  sectors  is 1.29  percent  of sales.
25  Note that the equation  we estimated  includes  the following  R&D  terrms
*  R&Dfirm
Y  = P8 0 +81.  + 13
2R &Dind  +  .. R  & Dind
*
Yi.  = 1  if Yic >  0,  Yic = O  otherwise
It is possible  that [1  is a function  of R&D  intensity  of an industry.  F'or  instance,  it is conceivable  that
1= ao +  lR & Dind
then
*  ~R&Dfr *  ~  R  firm
Yic  = 8  °  R+  &  Di d  + aR&D  firm +/ 3 2 R & Dind
Yic = 1 if Yic > 0,  Yic = ° otherwise
The estimation  of the above  equation  produced,  however,  insignificant  coefficients  ao and  ct.
17VI.  Concluding Remarks
The choice of entry mode by foreign investors has been of interest to both policy
makers and researchers in the field of international business. The changing attitudes towards
FDI, greater openness to foreign investment and lessening of restrictions on foreign ownership
have increased the need for understanding the impact foreign investors have on host
economies. Developing country governments are especially interested in the question of
technology and know-how transfer resulting from FDI. To be able to assess the potential
magnitude of such benefits, it is important to understand preferences of different types of
investors with respect to the entry mode. This study sheds some light on this issue by analyzing
entry modes chosen by foreign firms entering transition economies of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
We contribute to the literature by formulating and providing empirical support for new
hypotheses relating the intraindustry differences in R&D and marketing efforts to the choice of
entry mode. We also make an improvement over the existing studies by taking into account the
potential sample selection bias. Our results indicate that industry structure has a significant
impact on foreign investment decisions and thus treating industries as homogenous in
investigations of forces governing FDI flows may be inappropriate.
Our findings show that foreign investors that are technological and marketing leaders in
their sectors are less likely to undertake JVs than firms lagging behind. This effect is the most
prominent in high and medium technology industries. Thus, while it is widely believed that
JVs with local firms are more conducive to transferring knowledge and know-how than wholly
owned FDI projects, the potential magnitude of transfers from JVs in high R&D sectors may
be smaller than that from fully owned subsidiaries.
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22APPENDIX' II
TABLE 1. Entry  modes chosen by investors in the sample. Manufacturing  sectors only
No. of  Average of
No of JV  wholly  Total Do.  of  Population  transition
projects  in  owned  projects in  (mn)
the sample  projects in  the sample  1993  1994
the sample
Albania  3  1  4  3.2  2.50
Azerbaijan  1  1  2  7.4  1.33
Belarus  5  3  8  10.4  1.67
Bulgaria  16  13  29  8.5  2.50
Croatia  7  4  1  1  4.8  3.17
Czech  55  53  1C8  10.3  3.50
Estonia  16  8  24  1.5  3.33
FYR Macedonia  2  1  3  2.2  2.83
Georgia  4  2  6  5.4  1.33
Hungary  50  48  98  10.3  3.33
Kazakhstan  1  0  6  116  16.9  1.67
Latvia  13  6  119  2.6  2.83
Lithuania  8  5  13  3.7  3.00
Moldova  2  0  2  4.3  2.17
Poland  84  51  135  38.5  3.33
Romania  21  12  33  22.7  2.67
Russia  83  31  114  148.3  2.67
Slovakia  26  19  45  5.3  3.33
Slovenia  13  5  13  2.0  3.17
Turkmenistan  1  0  1  4.1  1.17
Ukraine  20  5  2.5  52.1  1.33
Uzbekistan  5  1  6  22.0  2.00
Mean or Total  445  275  720  16.0  2.45
23TABLE  2. Entry modes chosen by investors in the sample. Industry breakdown
JVs as % of all  Wholly owned
*  t  inthe  projects as % of INDUSTRY  projects  in the  Total industry  all projects in the
industry
Drugs, cosmetics & health  12.1  87.9  100
care products
Electronics  67.0  33.0  100
Aerospace  80.0  20.0  100
Chemicals  78.0  22.0  100
Machinery  & equipment  68.8  31.3  100
Electrical  32.3  67.7  100
Automotive  60.0  40.0  100
Diversified  88.5  11.5  100
Metal  72.2  27.8  100
Metal products  65.4  34.6  100
Paper  67.6  32.4  100
Beverages  20.0  80.0  100
Food  61.7  38.3  100
Apparel  50.0  50.0  100
Textiles  55.6  44.4  100
Tobacco  100.0  0.0  100
Printing  & publishing  60.0  40.0  100
24TABLE  3. Probit  model
Marg effects  Marg efiFects  Marg effects  Marg effects
Firm R&D  -0.0233***  -0.0257***
(0.0067)  (0.0068)
Industry R&D  -0.0370***  -0.0381***
(0.0074)  (0.0075)
Firm ADV  -0.0181***  -0.0185k**
(0.0035)  (0.0035)
Industry ADV  0.0017  0.0010
(0.0014)  (0.0015)
Diversification  0.0106  0.0116  0.0132  0.0136
(0.0151)  (0.0153)  (0.0100)  (0.0101)
Reg. Experience  0.0507  0.0314  0.0382  0.0201
(0.0681)  (0.0685)  (0.0427)  (0.0431)
Int'l Experience  -0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0020***  -0.0018**
(0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)
Firm Size  <.0001**  <.0001*  <.0001  <.0001
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Transition index  -0.1318**  -0.1478***
(0.0516)  (0.0387)
No of obs  346  346  603  603
Chi 2  84.01  90.74  49.84  64.99
D.f.  6  7  6  7
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Log L  -194.76  -191.39  -378.26  -370.68
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%X  level, ** significant at 5% level, *
significant at 10% level. <.0001 denotes coefficients with absolute value below .0001
25TABLE 4. R&D intensity of FDI projects in 3 digit SIC industries
High technology  SIC code  JVs  Wholly owned  All
sectors  projects
Drugs  283  10.62  15.71  15.23
Measuring and controlling devices  382  9.94  9.08  9.61
Aircraft and parts  372  7.48  9.44  8.08
Communications equipment  366  5.60  13.31  7.06
Medical instruments and supplies  384  4.58  5.07  4.99
Electronic components and  367  3.39  5.63  4.14
accessories
Computer and office equipment  357  4.09  4.09
Search  and  navigation  equipment  381  3.20  1  3.20
Average  6.36  12.67  9.54
Medium technology  SIC code  JVs  Wholly owned  All
sectors  projects
Refrigeration and service  358  7.26  7.26
machinery
Electric distribution equipment  361  7.26  7.26
Hose, belting, gasket and packing  305  6.00  6.00  6.00
Plastics materials and synthetics  282  4.65  4.86  4.71
Special industry machinery  355  4.22  5.68  4.70
Industrial inorganic chemicals  281  4.09  6.23  4.46
Motor vehicles and equipment  371  3.91  4.49  4.17
Railroad equipment  374  1.49  4.60  3.05
Household audio and video  365  5.79  1.03  2.93
equipment
Metalworking machinery  354  2.68  2.56  2.66
Soap, cleaners and toilet goods  284  2.60  2.60
General industrial machinery  356  2.30  2.30
Ship and boat building and repair  373  2.14  2.14
Engines and turbines  351  2.11  2.11  2.11
Construction and related  353  1.83  2.49  2.03
machinery
Industrial machinery, nec  359  1.75  1.75
Misc. manufactures  399  1.59  1.59  1.59
Misc. chemical products  289  1.31  1.31
Misc. plastic products, nec  308  1.22  0.11  1.11
Farm and garden machinery  352  0.00  3.68  0.74
Electric lightning, wiring  364  0.67  0.67
equipment
Rubber and plastics footwear  302  0.00  0.00  0.00
Average  3.21  3.76  3.35
26Low technology  SIC code  JVs  Wholly owned  All
sectors  projects
Printing trade services  279  5.25  5.25
Preserved fruits and vegetables  203  4.24  4.24
Broadwoven fabric mills, wool  223  4.00  4.00
Nonferrous rolling and drawing  335  :1.54  5.11  3.16
Heavy construction, exc. highway  162  2.70  2.70
Electrical work  173  2.67  2.67
Copper ores  102  [1.75  2.84  2.29
Cutlery, handtools and hardware  342  2.22  2.28  2.27
Nonresident building construction  154  1.25  2.94  1.93
Misc. food and kindred products  209  1.86  1.86
Sugar and confectionery products  206  1.83  1.83
Misc. metal ores  109  1.73  1.73
Manifold business forms  276  1.43  1.43
Misc. textile goods  229  1.40  1.40
Clay, ceramic and refractory  145  1.35  1.35
minerals
Secondary nonferrous metals  334  1.34  1.34
Primary nonferrous metals  333  1.23  1.23  1.23
Iron ores  101  1.21  1.21
Misc. converted paper products  267  0.21  1.34  1.15
Misc. nonmetallic mineral  329  0.76  2.43  1.13
products
Metal cans and shipping  341  1.20  0.79  0.99
containers
Blast furnace and basic steel  331  0.93  0.93
products
Meat products  201  0.79  0.91  0.85
Grain mill products  204  0.68  1.10  0.72
Glass and glassware pressed or  322  0.65  0.65
blown
Misc. wood products  249  0.63  0.63  0.63
Paper mills  262  0.60  0.67  0.61
Dairy products  202  0.57  0.57
Highway and street construction  161  0.55  0.55
Fabricated structural metal  344  0.00  0.82  0.55
products
Paperboard containers and boxes  265  0.44  0.33  0.40
Carpets and rugs  227  0.36  0.36
Cement, hydraulic  324  0.28  0.28
Fats and oils  207  0.15  0.15  0.15
Beverages  208  0.35  0.13  0.15
Gold and silver ores  104  0.00  0.00
Commercial printing  275  _  _  0.00  0.00
Average  _  0.87  1.76  1.28
27TABLE  5. Probit  model
Marg effects  Marg effects  Marg effects  Marg effects
Relative R&D  -0.0611**  -0.0638**  -0.0672**  -0.0738***
(0.0262)  (0.0263)  (0.0272)  (0.0279)
Industry R&D  -0.0462***  -0.0472***  -0.0542***  -0.0550***
(0.0106)  (0.0106)  (0.0112)  (0.0113)
Relative ADV  -0.1782**  -0.1934***  -0.2191***  -0.1800**
(0.0718)  (0.0724)  (0.0755)  (0.0770)
Industry ADV  0.0000  -0.0008  0.0000  -0.0003
(0.0023)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)
Diversification  0.0293*  0.0314**  0.0311*  0.0218
(0.0152)  (0.0153)  (0.0161)  (0.0166)
Reg. Experience  0.1011  0.0824  0.0709  0.0866
(0.0669)  (0.0673)  (0.0696)  (0.0714)
Int'l Experience  -0.0025**  -0.0022*  -0.0018  -0.0033**
(0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0013)
Firm Size  <.0001*  <.0001*  <.0001*  <.0001
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Transition index  -0.1217**
(0.0508)
US Parent  -0.1146
(0.1917)
European Parent  0.1641
(0.1861)
Host dummies  no  no  yes  yes
No of obs  346  346  345  345
Chi 2  66.31  72.18  86.51  97.34
D.f.  8  9  27  29
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Log L  -203.61  -200.67  -192.94  -187.52
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***  significant at 1%  level, **  significant at 5% level, *
significant at 10% level. <.0001 denotes coefficients with absolute value below .0001
28TABLE  6. Bivariate  probit  with  sample  selection
Entry mode Equation  Investment Equation
Marg effects  Marg effects
Relative R&D  -0.0698**  0.0003
(0.0742)  (0.0330)
Industry R&D  -0.0496***  -0.0002
(0.0298)  (0.0114)
Relative ADV  -0.2297***  0.0098
(0.1899)  (0.0788)
Industry ADV  -0.0022  0.0011***
(0.0072)  (0.0025)
Diversification  0.0247  0.0025*
(0.0442)  (0.0169)
Reg. Experience  0.0457  0.0433***
(0.2049)  (0.0702)
Int'l Experience  -0.0026*  0.0007***
(0.0038)  (0.0013)
Firm Size  <.0001**  <.0001***
(0.0000)  (0.0000)
Transition index  -0.1766***  0.0491***
(0.1585)  (0.0443)
Market Size  <0.0001***
(0.0000)
No of obs  7152
Log L  -1225.16
Standard  errors  are reported  in  parentheses.  *** significant  at 1%  level,  *  * significant
at 5%  level, * significant  at 10%  level.  <.0001  denotes  coefficients  with  absolute  value
below  .0001
29TABLE 7. Bivariate probit with sample selection. Marginal effects.
Blo°strom  et al.  R&D = 1% cutoff  R&D = 2% cutoff
classification
High * Relative R&D  -0.2275***  -0.1271***  -0.2828***
(0.1601)  (0.1162)  (0.1898)
Low * Relative R&D  -0.0305  0.0390  -0.0597
(0.1621)  (0.2423)  (0.1290)
High*  Industry R&D  -0.1049***  -0.0535***  -0.1140***
(0.0400)  (0.0318)  (0.0484)
Low * Industry R&D  -0.0997  1.1569  -0.0997
(0.3960)  (3.0105)  (0.3792)
High * Relative ADV  -0.4345***  -0.2837***  -0.5281***
(0.3127)  (0.2321)  (0.3674)
Low * Relative ADV  -0.2873  -0.8189*  -0.0984
(0.4282)  (1.1316)  (0.3005)
High *Industry ADV  -0.0014  -0.0028  -0.0026
(0.0089)  (0.0077)  (0.0096)
Low * Industry ADV  -0.0122  -0.0071  -0.0091
(0.0203)  (0.0664)  (0.0182)
High * Diversification  -0.0163  0.0028  -0.0241
(0.0567)  (0.0519)  (0.0638)
Low * Diversification  0.0794*  0.1870**  0.0552  *
(0.1013)  (0.2066)  (0.0800)
High *Reg.  Exp.  0.1760  0.1104  0.1382
(0.3044)  (0.2391)  (0.3627)
Low * Reg. Exp.  -0.3374*  -0.9271  -0.1039
(0.4880)  (1.4678)  (0.3454)
High * Int'l Exp.  -0.0007  -0.0022  0.0002
(0.0049)  (0.0046)  (0.0059)
Low * Int'l Exp.  -0.0040  -0.0034  -0.0025
(0.0076)  (0.0130)  (0.0070)
High * Firm Size  <.0001  <.0001*  <.0001
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Low * Firm Size  -0.0001**  -0.0001*  -0.0001**
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
High * Transition  -0.2308***  -0.1896***  -0.2163**
(0.2102)  (0.1736)  (0.2150)
Low * Transition  -0.1705  -0.0973  -0.1305
(0.3524)  (0.9443)  (0.3305)
No. Obs.  7152  7152  7152
Log L  -1159.79  -1188.00  -1156.67
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Classification of Industries by TechnoloDgy  Level 26
Low Technology

















Farm and garden machinery
Construction machinery
Other non-electrical machinery, except office and computing machinery
Household appliances
Radio, TV equipment
Motor vehicles and equipment






Office and computing machinery
Electronic components




26 Source:  Blomstrom,  Lipsey  and  Ohlsson  (1991,  Appendix  B, p. 233)
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